Biological Threats in the 21st Century

The following sections are included:

• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• About the Authors
• List of Common Abbreviations
• Photograph Sources and Descriptions

Biological weapons are complex systems that disseminate disease-causing organisms or toxins to harm or kill humans, animals or plants. They usually comprise a weaponized biological agent and a delivery mechanism, and are researched and developed in secrecy. The use of biological warfare (BW) on an industrial scale in World War I. In the late 20th century, bioterrorism emerged as a political concept and became a key security concern worldwide, involving governments, security agencies, scientists as well as public health organizations.

In World War II, imperial Japan attacked Chinese civilians with plague, cholera, anthrax, glanders and other diseases, killing thousands. The Japanese Imperial Army had begun supporting a biological weapons enterprise in Manchuria in the 1930s, led by military physician, Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro. Ishii attacked Chinese cities with plague-infected fleas, and later by dispersing disease agents by aerial spraying, bombing and sabotage. History teaches that ultra-nationalism and militarism, coupled with scientific and technological prowess, can provoke war without limits.

Britain: Research into biological weapons by a team of biologists working in secret at Porton first began in the 1940s. Research included both offensive and defensive aspects of biological warfare. During the Cold War, Britain's stated policy was that it was prepared to use biological weapons of mass destruction in retaliation in kind. By the mid-1950s, Britain had moved to a wholly defensive policy in biological weapons research. By the mid-1970s, concern had switched from threats of sabotage to terrorism.

US: The offensive and defensive phase (1942-1969) focused on producing a weapon rapidly; the later defensive phase (1970-present) explored multiple possibilities of offensive biological warfare before focusing on a few weapon/agent combinations. Biological agents included lethal, incapacitating and crop agents; all were ordered to be destroyed in 1970.

Canada: Did not have much biological warfare capability, but collaborated with Britain and the US from the 1940s. In the 1950s, Canada developed several anti-animal biological agents but always felt unprepared for biological warfare.

Open-air experiments by the UK and US began in the 1940s, alone, together or in collaboration with Canada. Tests conducted in the 1940s and during the Cold War were often not disclosed to the public, and only came to light when people in the targeted areas suffered consequences. The experiments left a legacy of unintended consequences such as lawsuits against the government.

The Soviet biological weapons program can be divided into two generations: 1918-1971 and 1971-1993. In 1918, a biological defense program to develop vaccines, treatments and prophylactics for soldiers encountering biological agents in warfare. This transitioned to an offensive posture in 1928 with work on the development of ammunition with pathogenic formulations. After 1971, the biological weapons program made use of genetic engineering to modify pathogens so that the biological weapons could not be predicted by the west. The research facilities masqueraded as civilian pharmaceutical enterprises, known as Biopreparat. Under pressure from the UK and the US, Russia agreed to discontinue its biological weapons program in 1992, but no access to UK and US inspectors to biological weapons sites has been granted.

Snapshots of life within the Soviet bioweapons program through the eyes of two scientists - Colonel Guennady Lepioshkin and Sergei Popov. Personnel were assigned to the work and did not have a choice. Salaries and benefits were good, and most found the work interesting, despite personal misgivings. The work was shrouded in secrecy and they worked under constant surveillance.

The Iraqis considered biological weapons a part of their comprehensive weapons of mass destruction capability. The biological weapons program began in 1974 but was shut down in 1979; it was restarted in 1983, ending in 1991 with Operation Desert Storm. After 1991, Iraq sought to protect its biological weapons infrastructure from UN inspections but was eventually forced to admit to its existence. Although large quantities of toxins were produced, there is no evidence that Iraq sought to develop a terrorist biological weapon.

Dr Kraatz-Wadsack was the Chief Inspector in charge of monitoring Iraq's biological facilities from 1995. She describes how she carried out inspections and uncovered an offensive program and other signs of a biological weapons program. She considers that the monitoring system deterred Iraq from resuming production of biological weapons.

South Africa's illegal biological weapons program, Project Coast, ran from the early 1980s to 1995. It was part of a larger chemical weapons program. Much research was done on potentially lethal toxins, with some work on other biological agents, microorganisms and chemical agents. The work on biological weapons was carried out at Roodeplat Research Laboratories which produced many lethal toxins.

In 1998, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Committee held a public hearing into Project Coast, the chemical and biological warfare program. Despite limitations on what could be revealed in public, many documents and reports were placed in the public domain which enabled independent researchers and academics to further study the program.

Four instances in which an individual or small group acquired biological agents intending to use them:

• RISE (1972) - a group teenagers in Chicago amassed a collection of biological agents intending to culture and disseminate them. It is doubtful if they would have been successful.
• Rajneeshees (1984) - a religious cult in Oregon planned to make voters sick and unable to vote in the 1984 election. Salmonella was used to contaminate food in restaurants, making more than 750 people ill.
• Aum Shinrikyo (1990-1995) - a religious cult in Japan made several attempts to produce the Botulinum toxin but there is no evidence that they were successful.
• Amerithrax (2001) - letters containing anthrax spores were mailed in the US, resulting in 22 infections and 5 deaths. Circumstantial evidence pointed to the attack being the work of one man, Bruce Ivins.

Examines terrorist innovation and the reasons why terrorists choose to use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Aside from the desire to cause mass casualties or great fear, the perpetrator must have suitable skills as well as access to appropriate laboratory resources and materials. Available information suggests that terrorists have not been interested in CBRN warfare. Predicting whether a terrorist group might explore CBRN warfare is difficult as there are too many variables.

The Amerithrax attacks, or anthrax mailings, revealed shortcomings in US biosecurity and raised fears of potential bioterrorism on US soil. US government legislation and programs were passed to deal with what was seen to be the growing bioterrorist threat, focusing mainly on the access to biological weapons-related materials and technology. There has been little study on socio-technical factors such as know-how, knowledge networks, and the larger socio-political-economic context in which biological weapons work is conducted.

Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) refers to life sciences research that has the potential to be misapplied and pose a threat to national security. Scientists involved in such research are required to assess the risks and benefits, and develop risk mitigation plans. A survey of US experts in biosecurity found that there was a wide diversity of views, demonstrating how challenging it is to assess risks and develop a regulatory system for dual use research.

Gain of Function (GOF) is usually used to describe a genetic mutation which confers dangerous properties to microbes. There are concerns about the biosecurity implications of research in biotechnology which can be misused in bioterrorism, leading to the defining of the category Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC). Much of the debate concerning GOF and DURC research is couched in terms of weighing the risks and benefits of research although it is not clear how an effective risk analysis can be carried out.

The Select Agent Rule of 1997 controlled the exchange of a list of bacteria, viruses and toxins between laboratories. In 2003, the Fink Report recommended guidelines on biotechnology research which had implications for biosecurity. By 2007, guidelines had been published for Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC). Notes the difficulty of making objective assessments of risk, and calls for scientists to demonstrate individual and corporate responsibility in carrying out research.

In 2014, the World Health Organization declared the Ebola outbreak in West Africa a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. Ebola became a securitized disease, i.e. outbreaks were framed in terms of the effects on and threats to human security. The US center for Disease Control classifies the Ebola virus as a bioterrorism agent. Although securitization of a disease promotes the idea that it warrants special attention, it can draw attention away from other public health issues.

The biodefense industry was born in the aftermath of 9/11 and Amerithrax. Its aim is to develop defense systems or medical countermeasures (MCM) against threats of biological warfare. The biodefense marketplace requires that health and defense policies are combined; support for development of MCM which are usually costly, risky, scientifically challenging and time consuming; and the opportunity to make a profit. The three main stakeholders of the biodefense industry are governments, commercial players, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organization (IGOs).

The threat of bioterrorism has resulted in an increase in the number of biodefense programs worldwide. Quandaries include how to optimize laboratory biosecurity so as not to be either too onerous or too lax; the challenge of managing dual use research which could also be used to develop malicious weapons; ensuring biosafety for researchers and the surrounding communities; complying with international conventions; and balancing public health priorities.

The 1925 Geneva Protocol generally prohibited the use of chemical and biological weapons of warfare, although several signatories reserved the right to retaliate in kind should such weapons be used against them. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) outlawed all biological weapons and was signed in 1972 by 85 signatories. However, it has since become clear that the Soviet Union was engaged in a massive biological weapons program in violation of the BWC. Since 1987, all member states have been obliged to submit data on facilities and activities related to the BWC. A recognized weakness of voluntary proposals is that countries must have confidence in the others' compliance.

This witness seminar was held on October 10, 2014 at the University of Sussex.

Four broad questions were discussed:

• Why was biological warfare given time on the international diplomatic calendar at the time?
• What was the role of public opinion?
• How influential were NGOs and individuals such as scientists and politicians?
• What was the reaction when chemical and biological weapons came to be treated as separate issues?

Steven Rose was instrumental in rallying scientists and sounding the alarm about military misuse of the life sciences in the 1960s and 1970s. In this interview, he comments on the role of scientists in the movement against chemical and biological weapons during that period.

The emphasis on legal obligations in the non-proliferation of biological weapons may not be effective. Another frame for scientific engagement is to consider what constitutes responsible conduct of science, which is part of the larger question of the social responsibilities of science. This should encourage scientists to understand and respect the impact their work has on security.

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction was formed in 2002 to help Russia and other countries destroy their stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and production facilities. Trevor Smith is from Canada's Global Partnership Program and comments on the work of the Global Partnership and the changing responses to biological weapons and bioterrorism.

Cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programs are multifaceted programs which involve partnerships between governments, and engage scientific and biomedical communities in building comprehensive biosecurity programs. In Afghanistan, CTR programs focused on mitigating the threat of biological warfare. In other environments, vaccine production is often the focus. Challenges to CTR programs include lack of human capital, funding and facilities.

Some of the foremost experts on biological disarmament and non-proliferation speak on the threat of biological weapons and the best responses to such threats. The discussion touches on the role of international organizations, governments, scientists, individuals and other segments of society.

The following sections is included:

• Index